NIST PQC Resources
Timeline, FAQs, videos, and links pulled from NIST's Post-Quantum Cryptography project -- the primary source ChatPQC grounds its answers in.
Project timeline
NISTIR 8105, "Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography," summarizes the state of quantum-resistant cryptography and signals that standardization work is coming.
NIST opens its public process to solicit, evaluate, and standardize quantum-resistant public-key algorithms.
69 candidate algorithms are submitted and accepted for Round 1 evaluation.
The candidate pool narrows through public analysis, academic cryptanalysis, and NIST evaluation across multiple rounds.
NIST announces CRYSTALS-Kyber (KEM) and CRYSTALS-Dilithium, FALCON, and SPHINCS+ (signatures) for standardization, plus four additional KEM candidates advancing to a Round 4.
Draft versions of FIPS 203, 204, and 205 are published for public review.
NIST publishes the first three post-quantum cryptography standards: ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA, ready for immediate adoption.
NIST selects HQC, a code-based KEM, as a structurally diverse backup to ML-KEM, to be standardized as a future FIPS.
Falcon standardization continues, alongside a separate on-ramp process evaluating additional general-purpose digital signature schemes beyond ML-DSA.
Per NIST IR 8547 and national policy, federal systems are directed to complete migration to PQC by 2035, with higher-risk systems facing earlier internal deadlines.
Videos
NIST overview video introducing why quantum computers threaten today's public-key cryptography and how the PQC standards address it.
Watch on nist.gov →A practitioner-focused webinar on planning and executing an organizational migration to PQC, presented by the NCCoE.
Watch on nist.gov →A technical deep dive on hardware benchmarking of PQC candidate algorithms during the standardization process.
Watch on nist.gov →Frequently asked questions
It shares features of a competition but isn't one in the traditional sense -- there are no single 'winners.' NIST selects multiple algorithms for standardization, eliminates unsuitable submissions, and may keep strong candidates under public license for future or specialized use.
No immediate change is necessary. Grover's algorithm only offers a quadratic speedup against symmetric ciphers, and practical/parallelization constraints erode much of that theoretical advantage. AES-128 is expected to remain secure for decades; AES-192/256 remain safe further out. NIST will issue updated guidance if that changes.
NIST accommodates hybrid key-establishment (combining a classical scheme like ECDH with a PQC KEM such as ML-KEM) in FIPS 140-validated modes, per SP 800-56C composite key-derivation guidance. This lets implementers hedge against unknown weaknesses in either the classical or post-quantum component during the transition period.
NIST IR 8547 and related federal policy set 2035 as the target for completing migration of federal information systems, with higher-risk or long-lived-secret systems expected to move sooner. Deploying new cryptographic infrastructure historically takes close to two decades, which is why NIST recommends starting migration planning now rather than waiting for cryptographically relevant quantum computers to materialize.
NIST is coordinating with standards bodies such as the IETF on stateful hash-based signatures rather than running them through the primary CFP process, since they don't fit the requested general-purpose signature API. Their use is expected to stay limited to applications like firmware/code signing where state management can be handled securely.
Condensed from NIST’s PQC FAQ page. See the full, current FAQ at csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/faqs.