Service 01

PQC Readiness Assessments

Score where your organization stands across the dimensions that determine how hard your post-quantum migration will be -- then ask the copilot to turn the gaps into next steps.

Cryptographic inventory

Do you have a current, accurate list of every algorithm, key size, certificate, and library in use across your systems, including third-party and vendor products?

Data sensitivity horizon

Which data needs to stay confidential for 10+ years? That data is exposed to 'harvest now, decrypt later' attacks today, even before quantum computers exist.

Cryptographic agility

Can your systems swap algorithms (e.g., via TLS library upgrades, HSM firmware, or config change) without a full re-architecture?

Vendor & supply-chain readiness

Have your critical vendors (cloud providers, HSM/PKI vendors, network appliances) published PQC support timelines?

Standards alignment

Is your roadmap aligned to FIPS 203/204/205 and the NIST IR 8547 2035 federal migration deadline, with earlier milestones for high-risk systems?

Team readiness

Do your engineering and security teams understand ML-KEM/ML-DSA/SLH-DSA well enough to review implementations and vendor claims?

Quick self-assessment

Answer honestly -- this runs entirely in your browser. Nothing is sent anywhere.

We maintain a cryptographic inventory (algorithms, key sizes, certs, libraries) across production systems.We know which of our data assets require confidentiality beyond 2035.Our TLS termination points and libraries support upgrading to hybrid PQC key exchange without major re-architecture.We've asked our critical vendors (cloud, HSM, PKI, network) for their PQC support timelines.We have an internal owner and budget line for the PQC migration program.Our engineering teams have working familiarity with ML-KEM and ML-DSA.We have a plan for certificate authorities and PKI to issue PQC or hybrid certificates.We've identified our highest-risk systems (long-lived secrets, critical infrastructure) for early migration.

0 / 8 confirmed (0 answered)Early stage

Most of the groundwork is still ahead of you. Start with a cryptographic inventory and identify systems protecting long-lived secrets -- those carry the most 'harvest now, decrypt later' risk.